APPENDIX A:
IRAN’S MAY 2003 NEGOTIATION PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES
The Iranian authorities sent the following negotiation proposal to the United States via the
Swiss in May 2003.
Iranian aims:
(The US accepts a dialogue “in mutual respect” and agrees that Iran puts the following aims on
the agenda)
• Halt in US hostile behavior and rectification of status of Iran in the US: (interference in
internal or external relations, “axis of evil”, terrorism list.)
• Abolishment of all sanctions: commercial sanctions, frozen assets, judgments (FSIA),
impediments in international trade and financial institutions.
• Iraq: democratic and fully representative government in Iraq, support of Iranian claims for
Iraqi reparations, respect for Iranian national interests in Iraq and religious links to
Najaf/Karbal.
• Full access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology.
• Recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests in the region with according defense
capacity.
• Terrorism: pursuit of anti-Iranian terrorists, above all MKO and support for repatriation of
their members in Iraq, decisive action against anti-Iranian terrorists, above all MKO and
affiliated organizations in the US.
US aims:
(Iran accepts a dialogue “in mutual respect” and agrees that the US puts the following aims on
the agenda)
• WMD: full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or
possess WMD, full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments
(93+2 and all further IAEA protocols)
• Terrorism: decisive action against any terrorists (above all Al Qaida) on Iranian territory, full
cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.
• Iraq: coordination of Iranian influence for activity supporting political stabilization and the
establishment of democratic institutions and a non-religious government.
• Middle East:
1) stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad etc.) from
Iranian territory, pressure on these organizations to stop violent action against civilians within
borders of 1967.
2) action on Hizbollah to become a mere political organization within Lebanon
3) acceptance of the Arab League Beirut declaration (Saudi initiative, two states-approach)
Steps:
I. communication of mutual agreement on the following procedure
II. mutual simultaneous statements “We have always been ready for direct
and authoritative talks with the US/with Iran in good faith and with the aim
of discussing—in mutual respect—our common interests and our mutual
concerns based on merits and objective realities, but we have always made it clear that, such
talks can only be held, if genuine progress for a solution of
our own concerns can be achieved.”
III. a first direct meeting on the appropriate level (for instance in Paris) will be held with the
previously agreed aims
a. of a decision on the first mutual steps
• Iraq: establishment of a common group, active Iranian support for
Iraqi stabilization, US-commitment to actively support Iranian reparation claims within
the discussions on Iraq foreign debts.
• Terrorism: US-commitment to disarm and remove MKO from Iraq
and take action in accordance with SCR1373 against its leadership, Iranian commitment for
enhanced action against Al Qaida members in Iran, agreement on cooperation and information
exchange:
*Iranian general statement “to support a peaceful solution in the Middle East
involving the parties concerned”
*US general statement that “Iran did not belong to ‘the axis of evil’”
*US-acceptance to halt its impediments against Iran in international financial and trade
institutions
b. of the establishment of three parallel working groups on disarmament, regional security
and economic cooperation. Their aim is an agreement on three parallel road maps, for the
discussions of these working groups, each side accepts that the other side’s aims (see above)
are put on the agenda:
1) Disarmament: road map, which combines the mutual aims of, on the one side, full
transparency by international commitments and guarantees to abstain from WMD with, on the
other side, full access to western technology (in the three areas)
2) Terrorism and regional security: road map for above mentioned aims on the Middle East and
terrorism
3) Economic cooperation: road map for the abolishment of the sanctions, rescinding of
judgments, and un-freezing of assets
c. of agreement on a time-table for implementation
d. and of a public statement after this first meeting on the achieved agreements
APPENDIX B:
ORIGINAL U.S. DRAFT NEGOTIATION PROPOSAL
According to the Iranian version, Tehran did not initiate the proposal but rather responded to
an American proposal. In the Iranian response, changes were made only to the section
describing the Iranian aims with the negotiation, while the U.S. aims were left untouched. The
original U.S. draft
follows.
Iranian aims:
(The US accepts a dialogue “in mutual respect” and agrees that Iran puts the following aims on
the agenda)
• US refrains from supporting change of the political system by direct interference from
outside
• Abolishment of all sanctions: commercial sanctions, frozen assets, refusal of access to WTO
• Iraq: pursuit of MKO, support of repatriation of MKO-members, support of Iranian claims for
Iraqi reparations, no Turkish invasion in North Iraq, respect for Iranian national interests in Iraq
and religious links to Najaf/Karbal.
• Access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology
• Recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests in the region with according defense
capacity.
• Terrorism: action against MKO and affiliated organizations in the US
US aims:
(Iran agrees that the US puts the following aims on the agenda)
• WMD: full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or
possess WMD,
full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all
further IAEA protocols)
• Terrorism: decisive action against any terrorists (above all Al Qaida) on Iranian territory, full
cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.
• Iraq: coordination of Iranian influence for activity supporting political stabilization and the
establishment of democratic institutions and a non-religious government.
• Middle East:
1) stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad etc.) from
Iranian territory, pressure on these organizations to stop violent action against civilians within
borders of 1967.
2) action on Hizbollah to become a mere political organization within Lebanon
3) acceptance of the Arab League Beirut declaration (Saudi initiative, two states-approach)
Steps:
I. communication of mutual agreement on the following procedure
II. mutual simultaneous statements “We have always been ready for direct and authoritative
talks with the US/with Iran with the aim of discussing—in mutual respect—our common
interests and our mutual
concerns, but we have always made it clear that, such talks can only be held, if genuine
progress for a solution of our own concerns can be achieved.”
III. a first direct meeting on the appropriate level (for instance in Paris) will be held with the
previously agreed aims
a. of a decision on the first mutual steps
• Iraq: establishment of a common group, active Iranian support for Iraqi stabilization, UScommitment to resolve MKO problem in Iraq, US-commitment to take Iranian reparation claims
into the discussions on Iraq foreign debts.
• Terrorism: Iranian commitment for enhanced action against Al Qaida members in Iran,
agreement on cooperation and information exchange
• Iranian general statement “to support a peaceful solution in the Middle East involving the
parties concerned”
• US-acceptance of Iranian access to WTO-membership negotiations
b. of the establishment of three parallel working groups on disarmament, regional security
and economic cooperation. Their aim is an agreement on three parallel road maps, for the
discussions of these working groups, each side accepts that the other side’s aims (see above)
are put on the agenda:
1) Disarmament: road map, which combines the mutal aims of, on the one side, full
transparency by international commitments and guarantees to abstain from WMD with, on the
other side, access to western technology (in the three areas)
2) Terrorism and regional security: road map for above mentioned aims on the Middle East and
terrorism
3) Economic cooperation: road map for the abolishment of the sanctions and solution of frozen
assets
c. and of a public statement after this first meeting on the achieved agreements
APPENDIX C: LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GULDIMANN TO THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
The following is the letter from Tim Guldimann, the Swiss ambassador to Iran, to the U.S. State
Department, dated May 4, 2003, explaining the background and authenticity of the Iranian
grand
bargain proposal.
1. On April 21, I had a longer discussion with Sadeq Kharrazi who came to see me (S.Kh. is the
Iranian Ambassador in Paris, former Deputy FM and nephew of the Foreign Minister, his sister
is married to the son of the Religious Leader Khamenei).During this discussion a first draft of
the enclosed Roadmap was developed. He said that he would discuss this with the Leader and
the Foreign Minister.
2. On May 2, I met him again for three hours. He told me that he had two long discussions
with the Leader on the Roadmap. In these meetings, which both lasted almost two hours, only
President Khatami and FM Kharrazi were present; “we went through every word of the this [sic]
paper”. (He additionally had a series of separate meetings with both).—The question is dealt
with in high secrecy, therefore no one else has been informed, (S.Kh. himself has become also
very discreet in our last contacts).—S.Kh. presented the paper to the Leader as a proposal,
which he had discussed with a friend in Europe who has close contacts with higher echelons
in the DoS. The Leader explicitly has asked him whether this is a US-proposal and S.Kh. denied
this, saying that, if it is accepted, this friend could convey
it to Washington as the basis for opening the bilateral discussion.
3. Then S.Kh. told me that the Leader uttered some reservations as for some points; the
President and the Foreign Minister were very positive, there was no problem from their side.
Then he said “They (meaning above all the Leader) agree with 85%–90% of the paper. But
everything can be negotiated.” (By ‘agree’ he meant to agree with the points themselves
referred to as ‘US aims’ in the Roadmap, and not only to agree that the US puts these points on
the agenda)—“There is a clear interest to tackle the problem of our relations with the US. I told
them, this is a golden opportunity, one day we must find a
solution”.—Then S.Kh. asked me whether I could present the enclosed Roadmap very
confidentially to someone very high in the DoS in order to get to know the US-reaction on it.—
He asked me to make some minor changes in the Roadmap draft of our previous meeting, we
re-wrote for instance the Iranian statement on the Middle-East, and he said that he thinks, that
this statement would be acceptable— “the peace process is a reality”.
4. Then he said: “If the Americans agree to have a discreet bilateral meeting on the basis of
this Roadmap, then this meeting could be arranged very soon. In this meeting our remaining
reservations could be discussed as well as the US would bring in their reservations on this
paper. I am sure that these differences can be eliminated. If we can agree on a Roadmap to
clarify the procedure, as a next step it could already be decided in this first meeting that the
two Foreign Ministers could meet for starting the process” along the lines of the Roadmap “to
decide on how to proceed to resolve everything from A till Z”. — Asked whether the meeting
between the two foreign ministers has been agreed by the Leader, he said “Look, if we can
agree on the procedure, I believe honestly that it is O.K.
for the meeting of the foreign ministers in Paris or Geneva, there is soon an occasion.”—Asked
whom he thinks would participate in the first discreet meeting, he mentioned Armitage,
referring to the positive positions of the latter on Iranian democracy.—I told him that I think
that this is impossible, but then he mentioned a meeting these days between Khalilzad and
Zarif (Ambassador to the UN) in Geneva on terrorism and said it could be a similar level from
the DoS and on their side maybe him or Zarif or both.
5. When I tried to obtain from him a precise answer on what exactly the Leader explicitly has
agreed, he said that the lack of trust in the US imposes them to proceed very carefully and very
confidentially. After discussing this problem with him I understood that they want to be sure
that if this initiative failed, and if anything about the new Iranian flexibility outlined in it became
known, they would—also for internal reasons—not be bound to it.—However, I got the clear
impression that there is a strong will of the regime to tackle the problem with the US now and
to try it with this initiative.